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Abstract 
 
We investigate the Philippine government’s price stabilization policy for rice.  Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions are used to examine the effectiveness of the program at regional and 
national levels over a 21-year period (January 1983 to December 2003). Results of the regional 
analysis indicate some NFA-induced spatial and temporal differences in terms of producer 
prices.  The NFA successfully increased producer prices in 5 of 13 regions through stock 
accumulation and paddy rice purchase at floor prices. NFA stock releases do not correlate 
strongly with retail prices at the national level, although results from the regional model indicate 
that NFA stock releases reduced retail prices in five regions, leading to perceptible spatial and 
temporal differences between regions. Although the NFA support price appears to have been 
moderately successful in increasing producer prices at a national level, on average, the support 
price led to an increase in consumer prices in ten regions and contributed little to price 
stabilization. Overall, therefore, our results indicate very limited success on the part of the NFA 
to achieve its major objectives at either regional or national level.  We suggest the NFA should 
concentrate its resources in the poorest areas of the country, where it might exert greater and 
more useful influence in smaller and locally thin rice markets.   2
Introduction 
Price stabilization is considered an important objective of agricultural policy, particularly in 
developing countries (Ferto, 1995).  Price stability could contribute to equity and poverty 
reduction by reducing the vulnerability of the poor to sudden shocks in food prices or availability 
(Timmer, 2004).  Price stability could also influence long-run economic growth, by facilitating 
investment in human capital (Williamson, 1993; Birdsall, et al., 1995).    
Numerous studies of price stabilization have documented the very large costs of 
intervention (Newbery and Stiglitz, 1979, 1981; Behrman, 1984; Williams and Wright, 1991; 
David, 1997).    In this paper, we focus on the effectiveness of interventions, analyzing monthly 
producer and consumer rice prices in the Philippines over the 21-year period January 1983 to 
December 2003.  We use Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) models to measure the 
magnitude of price changes associated with changes in government stocks and price supports 
implemented by the Philippine National Food Authority (NFA), for both national-average and 
region-specific prices.
1 
In the Philippines, the NFA has had a longstanding interest in supporting farmgate prices 
and reducing retail prices of rice, the country’s main staple.  Here we measure the links between 
NFA stock interventions and changes in rice prices, differentiating between producer and 
consumer prices.  Analysis at the national level controls for international trade, while analysis at 
the regional level takes account of domestic transportation and market integration.  
Our analysis extends previous empirical work on the Philippine rice market, much of 
which has questioned the efficacy of NFA actions (e.g., Baulch 1997, Reeder 2000, and Shively, 
                                                 
1Data explicitly cover 14 of the Philippines 16 regions.  The National Capital Region is excluded 
since it is a highly industrialized with a very minimal rice production area. The provinces which 
comprise the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) are reallocated over the other 
regions in Mindanao to facilitate construction of a time series data of rice prices in 13 regions.   3
Martinez and Masters, 2002).  That previous work uses national-average prices, however, which 
could mask the effectiveness of interventions at a regional or provincial level, to the extent that 
local markets are not fully integrated with the national market.  Thus, intervention in some 
regions could be effective, while interventions elsewhere might not be.  For this reason, we 
pursue our objectives by studying both national and regional data. 
 
The Philippine National Food Authority 
In the Philippines, rice is the staple food for 85 percent of the population. The price stabilization 
program implemented by the NFA aims to keep farmgate prices of rice at levels that provide 
farmers with a reasonable income and retail prices at levels that confer affordability for low-
income consumers.  To influence both the producer and the consumer prices, the NFA buys 
paddy rice from farmers during peak harvest periods, stores this rice in state-owned warehouses, 
processes this rice in state-owned rice mills, and then sells the milled rice to poor consumers 
during periods in which prices are at their seasonal highs.  The NFA’s regional and provincial 
offices manage approximately 296 warehouses with a combined storage capacity of more than 
one million metric tons of grains.  The NFA focuses almost exclusively on rice.   
During the past three decades, the Philippines was occasionally self-sufficient in rice (i.e., 
1978-1983, 1987, 1991, 1992, 1994), but during import years the quantities can be very 
significant.  In 2001, imported rice constituted about 10% of the total rice consumed in the 
country.
2  Historically, the NFA has controlled the importation of rice through quantitative 
restrictions.  Prior to 1996, the NFA was the country’s sole rice importer.  In 1996, with the 
                                                 
2 This is computed base from the figures reported by PhilRice (2003), where about 7.6 million 
metric tons of rice was supplied by local farms while about 0.8 million metric tons of the deficit 
was imported from other countries (mainly from Vietnam, Thailand and USA).   4
enactment of the Agricultural Tariffication Act, private enterprises gained the rights to import 
minimal quantities of rice.  It was only in 2003 that the private sector imported substantial 
quantities,
3  but NFA imports still accounted for 75% of total rice importation (NFA, 2005). 
 
Objectives 
This study aims to measure the impacts of NFA activities on rice prices.   Three questions are 
addressed: 
(1) Are NFA interventions associated with price stabilization? 
(2) Are NFA interventions associated with higher producer prices? 
(3) Are NFA interventions associated with lower consumer prices? 
We answer these questions from both regional and national perspectives.  At a regional level, the 
analysis aims to determine if the NFA successfully achieved its objectives for each of the 13 rice 
producing regions.  The regional analysis also aims to capture the spatial and temporal diversity 
of the Philippine rice market.  The extent of market diversity can be attributed to the country’s 
geographic conditions as an archipelago consisting of 7,107 islands and islets.  This situation 
contributes to price differentials due to very different cost of shipment to and from different 
locations.  At a national level, the analysis investigates links between NFA interventions, 
farmgate and retail prices, and international trade. 
 
                                                 
3 This is to be compared to the 2002 private importation of 100 metric tons.   5
Model 
Our empirical analysis builds on a model of competitive stock holding to predict price changes 
(Williams and Wright, 1991).  We posit a pair of SURs for farmgate and retail rice prices in 
auto-regressive form: 
it iht iht iht ijt ijt ijt ikt ikt i i it Y M NFA T P ε δ γ β α + ∑ + ∑ + + = ∆   (1) 
 
where it P ∆  represents the change in the average monthly price of rice (farmgate or retail) in 
region i at time t. We use T to represent a unit-step time trend, NFAikt to represent the monthly 
change in the NFA’s intervention of interest for region i at time t (where k serves as an index 
over three possible interventions: stock changes and changes in purchase and sales prices) and Mj 
is a binary indicator for month j, which we include to account for seasonal fluctuations in prices, 
if any. Yiht is a dummy variable for year, used to capture any inter-annual variation, while α, β, 
and γ are the unknown parameter vectors to be estimated. Equation 1 is used for regional 
analysis. 
We also construct a national model that includes international trade variables: 
() tk t k t j t j t j t h t h t h t t t t t t t t PT N F A M Y I R I R αβ γ δλ ηρ ε ∆= + + ∑ + ∑ + +∆+ × ∆ +  (2) 
 
where NFA now represents the national NFA intervention (either aggregate stock level or 
average price target) at time t, It is a binary indicator variable equal to 1 for any year in which 
rice importation took place, ∆Rt is the change in the international rice price (F.O.B. Bangkok), 
and() t I R ×∆ is an interaction term between importation and the international rice price at time t. 
The parameter vectors α, β, γ, δ, λ, η, and ρ are to be estimated. 
   6
Data and Data Sources 
Data are compiled from several sources.  Rice prices come from the Philippine Bureau of 
Agricultural Statistics and the NFA’s Business Development and Promotion section.   We 
deflated nominal prices to 1994 constant prices using national and regional CPIs collected from 
the Philippine National Statistics Office.  NFA stockholding data come from the NFA.  
International trade data come from the International Rice Research Institute and NFA.  World 
rice prices (F.O.B. Bangkok) were deflated using the currency conversion data from the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. The national data set consists of a pair of time series (farmgate and 
retail) each with 252 observations. The regional data set consists of two balanced panels, each 
with 13 regional cross-sections and 252 observations (n=3276). 
To illustrate the trends in real rice prices, Figure 1 presents a graph of farmgate, retail and 
international rice prices from 1983 to 2003.  From 1983 to 1992, policy appears to have favored 
consumers over producers as exhibited by the comparatively higher average world price and a 
more stabile (and falling) average retail price.  This pattern is consistent with that reported by 
Umali (1990) which argues that, from 1974 to 1986, the NFA favored consumers over producers.  
In contrast, beginning in 1994, policy appears to have shifted toward protecting producers from 
the decline in world prices as exhibited by the convergence of domestic farmgate prices and 
world prices.  The spike in the retail price in 1995 marks a food price “crisis” induced by policy 
failure (David 1997).
 4  One explanation is that the government did not have the right information 
when making decisions regarding the timing of rice importation. 
                                                 
4 In the popular press, this incident is often attributed to an “artificial rice shortage” emanating 
from rice middlemen.  It appears that there was no true rice shortage in 1995 based on evidence 
regarding domestic milled rice production and expected consumption graph (see Figure 2).   7
Figure 2 shows that the abrupt increase in the retail price coincided with a very low NFA 
rice stock in that year.  After the record high retail price in 1995, the NFA responded by building 
up its stock to record levels both by buying more rice locally and increasing imports.  In 1998, 
local rice production was very low due to El Niño.  This triggered a record high importation of 
about 2.1 million tons of rice.  In 1999, the NFA had accumulated an all time high stock of about 
12 million metric tons of rice.   One might posit that higher NFA stock levels from 1996 to 2003 
contributed to more stable rice prices.  Indeed, retail prices were relatively stable in these years.  
But it is clear from Figure 1 that consumers were paying very high retail prices for this stability, 
at the same time they were protecting producers from the slide in the world price. 
Domestic retail prices appear to have been less variable than the world price as exhibited 
in Figures 3 and 4.  Figure 3 shows monthly percentage changes in local rice prices from 1983 to 
2003.  This measure of price variability suggests two stages: one ranging from 1983 to 1996, 
characterized by relatively higher price variability; and a second (1997 onwards) in which the 
magnitude of price fluctuations decreased. The latter pattern can be attributed to the higher 
amount of purchases of local paddy rice and greater volume of rice importation. 
Figure 5 presents percentage changes in the volume of monthly rice stocks of the NFA 
from 1983 to 2003.  The graph illustrates sharp increases and decreases in stock volumes, but 
from 1999 to 2003 there appears to have been a decrease in the variability of NFA stock levels.  
This can be traced to the higher rice inventory (as shown in Figure 2).  The higher inventory 
levels were made possible by higher NFA budget allocations in those years. 
As mentioned earlier, the NFA provides the low-income segment of the market with 
relatively cheaper milled rice while it buys paddy rice from at a relatively higher farmgate price.  
This scenario is exhibited in Figure 6, which presents average monthly prices over the 21-year   8
period, along with NFA support prices.  Average domestic retail prices are the highest among the 
five price series, with an average of P13.53 per kg of milled rice.  On average, the retail price is 
21% higher than the average NFA consumer support price.  The average world price is 35% 
lower than the domestic retail price.  The fourth line in Figure 6 (ordered from the top to bottom) 
represents the NFA producer support price.  This producer support price was, on average, 7% 
higher than the average farmgate price.   
Figure 7 shows the average monthly NFA injection and the average monthly 
procurement.  The NFA injects the greatest volume of its rice stock into the market during the 
months of July, August and September when retail prices typically reach their highest annual 
level.  The NFA sells this rice at a lower price compared to the average retail price.  During the 
21-year study period, the NFA injected about 9%, on average, of the total rice consumed in any 
given year.  On the other hand, the NFA marks its largest domestic during October, November 
and December.  Farmgate prices are lowest during October.  During the study period, the NFA 
purchased, on average, about 4% of the total rice produced in the country. 
It is important to note that the aggregate patterns displayed in Figures 1 to 7, may mask 
important regional differences.  For example, price variability differs in access regions reflecting 
local conditions and relative degrees of success.  Table 1 presents correlations among regional 
price changes.  Most regions of the country display high degrees of positive correlation.  Most 
pair-wise correlations are statistically significant. 
 
Results 
Before embarking on analysis, we tested the national and regional data sets for time trends and 
stationarity.  Dependent variables for the regression models are farmgate and retail prices.   9
Independent variables include NFA producer and consumer support prices.  Stationarity tests for 
the four sets of prices indicate that none of them display a significant quadratic or linear time 
trend.  The dependent variables for analysis are therefore constructed in first differences (i.e., 
) 1 − − t t p p .  This approach can be justified by results from the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
test for unit root.
5   All series satisfy the stationarity test (see Table 2).   
All regression models are estimated using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
method.  This method estimates the parameters of the system, accounting for heteroskedasticity, 
and contemporaneous correlation in the errors across equations (Greene, 2003). Estimates of the 
cross-equation covariance matrix are based upon parameter estimates of the unweighted system. 
 
The National Level Analysis 
For the analysis of national level data, three regression models (Models 1, 2 and 3) are used.  
Results are presented in Table 3.  Model 1 is the base model in which a constant, a time trend 
and monthly indicators capture all exogenous effects.  Model 2 adds to Model 1 two NFA 
intervention variables: the first difference in the rice stock and the first difference in the producer 
support price.  Model 3 adds to Model 2 the first difference in the NFA consumer support price, 
the first difference in the international rice price, an indicator variable for importation, and an 
interaction variable between importation and the international rice price.
 6   
                                                 
5After constructing all the needed data sets and prior to estimating equations (2) and (3), the 
series were tested for stationarity using AR(1) regressions allowing for cross-section correlation.  
Stationarity is defined as a quality of a process in which the mean, standard deviation, and 
autocorrelation structure do not change with time (Challis and Kitney 1991). 
6 Model 2 includes only the independent variables that are not significantly correlated with each 
other. However, there may be omitted variable problems in this specification.  This gives rise to 
Model 3 which includes all the available data on NFA intervention, importation and international 
rice prices as regressors.  Since it was detected that significant correlations exist between the 
producer support prices and the consumer support prices, a series of regressions were used to test   10
The three major groups of regressors for Model 3 are NFA intervention variables, 
international trade variables and the indicator variables for months and years.  The indicator 
variables for months aim to capture seasonal variation in prices, with January serving as the 
month of reference.  The indicator variables for the years 1983 to 2003 capture inter-annual 
variation in prices, with 1983 serving as the base year. 
Results from Model 3 indicate that a 1% increase in the NFA producer support price is 
associated with a 0.2% increase in the farmgate price, ceteris paribus.  One might view this 
pattern as benefiting the 2.5 million rice producing households that account for approximately 
19% of the Philippine population.  However, a 1% rise in the NFA producer price was also 
associated with a 0.09% increase in the retail price, an increase that was shouldered by the 
approximately 85% of the Philippine population whose staple food is rice (PhilRice, 2003).  The 
negative correlations between NFA stock changes and farmgate and retail prices is consistent 
with the fact that NFA does the bulk of its rice purchasing during the peak harvest months of 
September and October when the farmgate prices are low (see the monthly estimates in Table 3).  
The negative coefficient on the NFA stock change indicates that the NFA injects rice mainly 
during the months of July, August and September, when retail prices are highest (and the supply 
of rice is at its lowest).  
The discussion is illustrated by way of Figure 8.  Figure 8 shows the monthly patterns of 
prices with and without NFA intervention (derived from Models 1 and 2, respectively).  The 
graph displays the coefficient estimates for the monthly dummy variables for each price.  The 
solid lines represent the monthly price changes without NFA interventions while the dotted lines 
                                                                                                                                                             
for multicollinearity problems.  The results of these tests show that the signs and magnitudes of 
the point estimates are fairly robust to choice of specification.  Thus, there appears to be no 
serious multicollinearity for Model 3.   11
represent the monthly price changes with NFA intervention variables (NFA stock, producer 
support prices and consumer support prices). 
Similar to previous findings, we see that, at the national level, the NFA interventions did 
achieve the intended effect on the monthly price changes.  However, the magnitude of the effect 
of the NFA interventions is very small.  Results show that farmgate prices with NFA intervention 
are slightly higher than those without NFA intervention.  The biggest gap between the with and 
without NFA intervention occurs in the month of October when the farmgate price, on average, 
is pulled up by about 1.4 percentage points.  With regard to the changes in retail prices, the 
biggest gap between prices with and without NFA intervention occurs in the month of October, 
although the magnitude of the increase is smaller at only 0.6 percentage point. 
Model 3, which includes the NFA consumer support prices, reveals no significant 
correlation between the price ceiling and the farmgate and consumer prices. One interpretation of 
this is that while the government tries to sell cheaper rice into the market to target the very poor, 
at the national level this price ceiling does decrease the average national retail price due to the 
small volume of NFA rice relative to the total market.  From 1983 to 2003, on average, NFA rice 
accounted for only about 8.9% of the total rice consumed in the Philippine market.  This 
percentage share of NFA rice in the market fluctuates from year to year.  Within the 21-year 
period, the lowest share occurred in 1994 (1.5% ) and the highest occurred in 1998 (20.8%). 
With respect to international trade, the indicator variable for rice importation in Model 3 
shows that, at the national level, rice importation is correlated with neither the farmgate nor the 
retail price.  The change in world price as well as the interaction between importation and world 
price also display no significant correlation with national prices.  These results indicate that 
international trade has no significant direct influence on local prices.  Again, this can be   12
attributed to the limited volume of imported rice relative to the total volume of rice consumed in 
the country.  Over the 21-year period, on average, imported rice accounted for only 6.2% of 
national consumption.  During the 21-year period, there was no rice importation at all in 10 of 
the years. The proportion of imported rice to total consumption was highest in 1998 when 
imports accounted for about 27.2% (see Figure 2).
7 
Turning to the question of variability, Figure 9 illustrates the degree to which the 
domestic retail price fluctuates less than the international price.  From 1983 to 2003, the 
domestic retail price had only one major spike (an increase of 20% in 1995), while the 
international price had roughly four major spikes in prices (all of them more than 18%); two 
occurred in 1984 and one each occurred in 1994 and 1998.  Figure 10 is a boxplot of these two 
price series and shows that the international price had greater variance and more outliers than did 
the retail price.  The greater variance in the international price is indicated by a higher average 
coefficient of variation (13% compared to 3% for the domestic retail price).  Results of a paired 
t-test show that these annual CVs are significantly different at a 1% test level.  Despite the lower 
variability of the domestic retail price, international prices were 46% lower, on average, than 
domestic prices.
8  
Although some of the independent variables in Model 3 are undoubtedly correlated, 
estimates from Model 3 are similar to those of Model 2.  In Model 3, inter-annual variation is 
captured by the inclusion of year indicator variables.  In the regression for Model 3, all indicator 
                                                 
7 As mentioned earlier, there was an occurrence of the El Niño phenomenon in 1998 which 
significantly reduced the local rice production in that year. 
8 To better compare the variability of the two price series, future work should analyze the 
national level data set using a seasonal Generalized AutoRegressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model (Ghysels and Osborn, 2001) and (Hamilton, 1994).  The 
seasonal GARCH model would help determine whether the seasonal variability in international 
prices is significantly greater than that of the local retail prices.   13
variables for 1984 to 2003 were included. However, only the point estimates for the years 1991 
and 1995 are significant and included in Table 3.  In 1991, farmgate prices were significantly 
lower by 2.8 percent as compared to the reference year (1983) while retail prices did not show a 
significant change in fluctuation.  In 1995, due to the occurrence of a rice shortage, farmgate and 
retail prices were significantly higher by 2.2 and 1.6 percent, respectively.  There were no 
significant annual differences in retail and farmgate prices in other years. 
To examine the relationship between the variables in the regression, correlation 
coefficients are presented in Table 4.  Changes in farmgate prices are positively correlated with 
changes in the NFA stock.  This indicates that increases in the NFA stock may have contributed 
to higher farmgate prices.  The positive correlation between NFA changes stock and the indicator 
variable on importation arises because increases in NFA stocks result from rice importation.  The 
negative correlation between the international price change and the NFA stock change indicates 
that the NFA is less likely to import when international prices are high.  
 
The Regional Level Analysis 
The regional analysis covers the 13 rice producing regions in the country.  The NFA maintains 
storage facilities in key rice producing areas which are responsible for the implementation of the 
NFA’s market intervention activities.  The regional level analysis includes only the NFA’s 
intervention measures and not international trade since initial regression results did not show 
significant correlation between the international trade variables and the regional rice prices.  In 
addition, we defected what we believed to be spurious correlation between the international rice 
price and the domestic retail price in some regions.   14
Results for each regional cross sectional data set show that NFA activities are correlated 
with price changes, although the associations were in nearly all instances.  Of the 13 regions, 
Region 4 exhibits the features of the “typical” region.  For this reason, coefficients for the 
monthly dummy variables from this regression are presented in Figure 11 to illustrate seasonal 
changes in prices for all the 13 regions.  The graphs with solid lines represent the price patterns 
controlling for NFA intervention while the graphs in broken lines take into account the price 
changes with NFA interventions.  The effect of NFA intervention on price stabilization at the 
regional level is also similar to that observed at the national level (as presented in Figure 8). 
The model specified in Equation 3 was run for each regional data set.  A condensed 
summary of the regional results is presented in Table 5.  A detailed summary is presented in 
Table 6.   Only in Region 4 are farmgate prices negatively correlated with the change in the NFA 
stock.  This indicates that the NFA regional office in Region 4 buys most of the NFA’s locally 
purchased rice during the times when farmgate prices are low.  On average, over the study 
period, the NFA purchased about 26% of its total rice procurement from Region 4, ranging from 
a low of 10% in 1983 to a high of 59% in 1998. 
In terms of retail prices in five regions (Regions 1, 4, 5, 9 and 12), the retail price change 
is negatively correlated with the change in the NFA stock.  This indicates that a decrease in the 
NFA stock results in a release of lower-priced milled rice into the market in the specific region.  
Five regions therefore had significantly lower retail prices resulting from the NFA release, 
particularly during the months of July, August and September (when the supply of rice is 
relatively lower and the retail price is relatively higher).  On average, the NFA has the highest 
accumulation of stock during the months of June and July and then rapidly releases these stock 
into the market during the months of August, September and October (see Figure 12).  The NFA   15
starts to accumulate its rice stock in November by purchasing rice during the peak of the harvest 
season.  The NFA usually has two major procurement periods in a given year: the first occurs 
during the months of November and December, the peak harvest period for the main (wet) 
cropping; the second occurs happens during the months of April and May, when harvested rice 
for the second (dry) cropping is usually sold. 
With regard to the NFA producer support price, rice producers in five regions (Regions 4, 
6, 10, 12 and 13) benefited from NFA actions as exhibited by the positive correlation between 
the farmgate price and the producer support price.  However, the producers’ price variable is also 
positively correlated with the retail price in 10 regions.  One interpretation of this pattern is that 
while rice producers in 5 regions may be getting a higher income from rice farming, rice 
consumers in 10 regions are buying significantly more expensive rice.  For the regions in which 
the NFA support price is correlated with both farmgate and retail prices, the percentage increase 
in the farmgate price is usually twice as much as the percentage increase in the retail price.  This 
is consistent with the results in the national level analysis. 
While the NFA injects cheaper rice into the market to cater to the poorer segment of the 
market, the results show that the volume of cheaper rice injected is not sufficient to significantly 
bring down the overall average retail prices in any of the thirteen regions.  However, the NFA 
consumer support price is positively correlated with the farmgate prices in Regions 3 and 9.  This 
may indicate that the consumer support price contributes to higher producer prices in these 
regions. 
Farmgate and retail prices rise and fall from month to month.  Using January as the base 
month, the SUR results at the regional level in Table 5 show that farmgate prices are at their 
lowest level during the months of September and October in 11 of 13 regions, during the peak   16
harvest season.  This is consistent with the pattern displayed in the national level analysis where 
September and October have a seven percent lower farmgate price compared with January.  
Retail prices reach their peak in 12 of 13 regions during the month of August when the supply of 
rice in the market falls to its lowest level. This is exhibited by the positive correlation between 
the domestic retail price and the dummy variable for August in the regional regressions.  These 
results are also consistent with national analysis. 
Although one might hypothesize that consumer support prices play an important role in 
poorer regions of the country, we find no significant correlation between the consumer support 
price and the regional retail price in any of the 13 regions (Table 5). 
The annual indicator variables are used to capture inter-annual variation in prices from 
1983 to 2003, where 1983 serves as the reference year.  Results show that, in most years and in 
most regions, prices at the regional level have no significant inter-annual variation.  In 1991, 
1993, 1995 and 1996, one to four regions had price variations that are significantly different 
from zero.  The indicator variable for 1991 reveals that there are two regions with significantly 
lower farmgate prices in 1991 relative to their respective 1983 prices.  For retail prices, only 
Region 7 had a significantly lower retail price in 1991.  The highest spike of the graph in Figure 
3, which indicates an abrupt increase in the national retail rice prices in 1995, was found in only 
four regions (Regions 1, 4, 5 12).  In 1996, Regions 2 and 3 experienced a significantly lower 
farmgate price compared to the 1983 price.   
 
Conclusions, Policy Implications and Directions for Future Work 
In studying the price stabilization objective of the NFA, results suggest that NFA interventions 
could have had, to a limited extent, the desired correlations with rice prices.  But the association   17
with price stabilization at the national level appears to be very small, and at the regional level it 
appears only in some regions.  It appears that the size and diversity of the rice market, relative to 
the modest scale of NFA activity, limits the program’s influence on prices. 
In terms of the NFA’s goal of increasing the income of rice farmers, NFA interventions 
are, to their limited extent, associated with increased farmgate prices though stock accumulation 
and producer support prices.  Thus, interventions may have contributed to significantly higher 
average farmgate prices, although the magnitude of the effect is small as the NFA buys only 
about 3.4% of the total rice produced in the country.  Disaggregating by region, the correlation 
holds in five regions, which account for about 35% of the rice harvested area in the country. 
At the retail level, NFA sales of rice show no significant correlation with consumer prices 
at the national level, but they are associated with significantly lower average retail prices in five 
regions.  Changes in the consumer support price level were not significantly correlated with the 
average retail price at either the national or regional level.   
Although the NFA could have achieved its objective in increasing farmgate prices at the 
national level and decreasing retail prices in five regions, its interventions did not clearly help to 
stabilize prices, and on balance are associated with a higher retail rice price in most regions of 
the country. 
It is important to point out that this study is limited in important ways.  First, some 
regions in the country have very diversified markets. This is particularly true of Region 4 which 
is the country’s largest region. It might be preferable, therefore, to conduct this analysis using 
provincially disaggregated data, perhaps focusing on the poorest provinces where the rural   18
communities have a stronger need for price stabilization.
9  Second, it also seems advisable to 
conduct statistical and economic analyses comparing price variability between domestic and 
international prices.  One might, for example, use a seasonal GARCH approach to test for 
differences in price variability. Third, the use of panel data opens several avenues for inquiry to 
study the impacts of government interventions. So, for example, the regional level data used here 
could be used to address regional heterogeneity in more depth, perhaps using Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) or spatial econometric methods. 
                                                 
9 For example, Region 4 can be subdivided into two major groups of provinces: Calabarzon and 
Mimaropa.  The Calabarzon group is composed of relatively more industrialized, and smaller 
provinces near Metro Manila. Mimaropa consists of relatively larger and rural island provinces. 
   19
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Table 1.  Correlation matrix of the first difference in rice retail prices (natural logs). 
Region  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  13 
1  1.00              
2  0.61  1 . 0 0              
3  0.62 0.56 1 . 0 0             
4  0.30 0.35 0.66 1.00           
4  0.54 0.54 0.52 0.24 1.00          
6  0.44 0.42 0.36 0.27 0.50 1.00         
7  0.42 0.35 0.39 0.17 0.38 0.39 1.00        
8  0.39 0.35 0.39 0.25 0.38 0.35 0.38 1.00       
9  0.41 0.37 0.36 0.17 0.38 0.32 0.33 0.30 1.00        
10 0.04  0.09  0.05 -0.05 0.10 0.09 0.07  0.13 0.12 1.00      
11  0.45 0.42 0.40 0.20 0.45 0.45 0.38 0.37 0.40 0.12 1.00    
12  0.37 0.35 0.32 0.22 0.36 0.48 0.32 0.31 0.37 0.17 0.42 1.00  
13  0.61 0.52 0.56 0.30 0.54 0.38 0.35 0.34 0.38 -0.06  0.37 0.45 1.00 
Note: Correlation coefficients (ρ) in bold are statistically different from zero at a 95% 
confidence level (2-tails).  The ρ's in italics are significant at a 90% level. 
 
 
Table 2.  ADF unit root tests results for the four prices of the nationally aggregated data.
10 
Price Data 
θ ˆ t   1% critical value 
Farmgate -10.191  -3.990 
Retail -10.446  -3.990 
NFA producer support  -11.498  -3.990 
NFA consumer support  -12.179  -3.990 
 
                                                 
10 Regional tests of stationarity are not reported here but can be obtained upon request.   22
Table 3. SUR estimates of farmgate and retail price changes for the Philippine aggregate data. 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Item 
Farmgate Retail Farmgate Retail Farmgate Retail 
Constant  0.0236*** -0.0030 0.0273*** -0.0014  0.0251** -0.0027 
  (0.0079) (0.0052) (0.0076) (0.0051) (0.0116) (0.0078) 
Time -2.02E-05  -1.88E-05  -1.4E-05 -1.6E-05 1.69E-06  -3.55E-05 
  (2.75E-05) (1.81E-05) (2.64E-05) (1.79E-05) (5.28E-05) (3.53E-05) 
February 0.0047  0.0058  -0.0022  0.0031  0.0043  0.0024 
  (0.0098) (0.0065) (0.0096) (0.0065) (0.0098) (0.0066) 
March  -0.0165* 0.0052  -0.0236**  0.0022 -0.0163* 0.0026 
  (0.0098) (0.0065) (0.0096) (0.0065) (0.0099) (0.0066) 
April  -0.0114 0.0057 -0.0144 0.0044 -0.0073 0.0049 
  (0.0098) (0.0065) (0.0095) (0.0064) (0.0099) (0.0066) 
May  -0.0076 0.0116* -0.0102  0.0104  -0.0040  0.0096 
  (0.0098) (0.0065) (0.0095) (0.0064) (0.0098) (0.0066) 
June  -0.0031 0.0086 -0.0071 0.0069 -0.0016 0.0047 
  (0.0098) (0.0065) (0.0095) (0.0064) (0.0100) (0.0067) 
July  -0.0119 0.0195*** -0.0143 0.0182*** -0.0085  0.0169** 
  (0.0098) (0.0065) (0.0095) (0.0064) (0.0101) (0.0067) 
August  -0.0267*** 0.0298*** -0.0320*** 0.0272***  -0.0247**  0.0276*** 
  (0.0098) (0.0065) (0.0096) (0.0065) (0.0101) (0.0067) 
September  -0.0819*** 0.0090 -0.0825*** 0.0081 -0.0744*** 0.0098 
  (0.0098) (0.0065) (0.0097) (0.0065) (0.0101) (0.0068) 
October  -0.0708*** -0.0178*** -0.0845*** -0.0239*** -0.0761*** -0.0240*** 
  (0.0098) (0.0065) (0.0101) (0.0068) (0.0102) (0.0069) 
November  -0.0309***  -0.0165**  -0.0335*** -0.0175*** -0.0277*** -0.0182*** 
  (0.0098) (0.0065) (0.0095) (0.0064) (0.0100) (0.0067) 
December  -0.0017 -0.0009 -0.0035 -0.0016 0.0020 -0.0030 
  (0.0098) (0.0065) (0.0095) (0.0064) (0.0100) (0.0067) 
NFA Stock (∆)     -0.0291***  -0.0144*  -0.0208* -0.0108 
     (0.0111)  (0.0075)  (0.0119) (0.0080) 
NFA Prod. Price (∆)     0.1950***  0.0729**  0.1957*** 0.0931*** 
     (0.0481)  (0.0325)  (0.0463) (0.0310) 
NFA Cons. Price  (∆)        0.0806 -0.0191 
       (0.0657) (0.0440) 
World price  (∆)        -0.0290 -0.0400 
       (0.0630) (0.0422) 
Imports  (0/1)       -0.0075 0.0057 
       (0.0126) (0.0084) 
Imports and World price  
(∆)       0.0471 0.0785 
       (0.0769)  (0.0515) 
Indicator for 1991         -0.0285**  -0.0100 
      (0.0133)  (0.0089) 
Indicator  for  1995       0.0219**  0.0155** 
       (0.0104)  (0.0070) 
Number  of  Obs  251 251 251 251 251 251 
R
2  0.4173 0.2764 0.4628 0.2984 0.5052 0.3654 
P-value  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: (1)  *** significant at 99% confidence level;   ** significant at the 95% level;  * significant at the 90% confidence level 
(2) Standard errors are enclosed in parentheses.  (3) Dependent variables are first difference of retail and wholesale prices.   23
Table 4.  Correlation matrix of the major regression variables. 





















Farmgate  1.0000         
Retail  0.3667  1.0000        
NFA stock  0.1141  -0.0868  1.0000       
NFA producer prices  -0.0610  -0.0822  0.0872  1.0000         
NFA consumer prices  -0.0507  -0.0709  0.0958  0.9670  1.0000      
Importation (IM)  0.0041  0.0282  0.1770 0.3236 0.3982 1.0000    
International prices (IP)  0.0013  0.0449  -0.1284  -0.0456 -0.0155 0.0145  1.0000  
IM and IP interaction  0.0462  0.0805  -0.1190  -0.0002 0.0278 -0.0133 0.8213  1.0000 
Note: Correlation coefficients (ρ) in bold are statistically different from zero at a 90% 
confidence level (2-tails). 
 
 
Table 5. Condensed summary of the SUR regional analysis results. 
Farmgate Retail  Variable 
No. of regions  Percentage  No. of regions  Percentage 
NFA Stock ( – )  1  8  5  38 
NFA Prod. Price  ( + )  5  38  10  77 
NFA Cons. Price ( + )  2  15  0  0 
February ( + )  2  15  2  15 
March  1 (+), 1 (–)  15  2 (+)  15 
April  2 (+), 2 (–)  31  2 (+), 1 (–)  23 
May  1 (+), 1 (–)  15  4 (+)  31 
June  2 (+), 1 (–)  23  3 (+)  23 
July ( + )  1  8  8  62 
August  2 (+), 4 (–)  46  12 (+)  92 
September  11 (–)  85  3 (+), 1 (–)  31 
October ( – )  11  85  6  46 
November  1 (+), 5 (–)  46  6 (–)  46 
December  3 (+), 1 (–)  31  2 (–)  15 
Indicator for 1991 ( – )  2  15  1  8 
Indicator for 1993 ( + )  0  0  1  8 
Indicator for 1995 ( + )  1  8  4  31 
Indicator for 1996 ( – )  2  15  0  0 
Note: (1) “No. of regions” refers to the number of regions significantly correlated at the 90% 
confidence level.  (2) This table only includes the indicator variables for the years when the 
inter-annual variation in prices are significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence level.  
(3)  The above summary is detailed in Table 6 where ‘R1’ represents Region 1.  24
Table 6.  Detailed summary of the SUR results by region. 
Farmgate Retail  Variable 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9  R10 R11 R12 R13 R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9  R10 R11 R12 R13 
Time trend                            
NFA stock        --                    --      --  --        --      --   
NFA producer price       +  +      +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +  +    +  +  +  + 
NFA consumer price      +    +                                           
February     +         +           +      +         
March          --      +            +      +                   
April        +      +    --  --  +     +      --       
May                +          --        +    +  +        +     
June     +       +       --      +  +    +        
July                  +            +    +      +  +  +  +  +  +   
August    --        --    + +      -- -- + + + + + + + + +    + + + 
September  --  --  --  --  --  --  --    --  --    --  --      +  +    --  +             
October  -- -- -- -- -- -- --      -- -- -- -- -- --        --      --    -- --   
November  --  --    --    +            --  --  --  --  --  --              --    -- 
December       +      +  +     --  --     --           
Indicator for 1990                                                     
Indicator for 1991     - -   - -                   - -         
Indicator for 1992                                                     
Indicator for 1993                  +             
Indicator for 1994                                                     
Indicator for 1995      +             +      +   +          +    
Indicator for 1996    --  --                                               
 
Note: ‘--’ indicates a coefficient with a negative sign significant at the 90% confidence level. 
‘+’ indicates a coefficient with a positive sign significant at the 90% confidence level. 
In the original regression, the indicator variables are complete from 1984 to 2003 with 1983 serving as the year of reference. 
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Figure 4. First difference in monthly price, FOB Bangkok (January 1983 to December 2003). 




















































































































































































Figure 6. Average monthly rice prices (January 1983 to December 2003). 
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Figure 10.  Boxplot of the local retail and international rice prices. 













































































Figure 12. Average monthly NFA rice stock (January 1983 to December 2003). 
Farmgate 
Retail
 –   without NFA intervention 
 --- with  NFA  intervention 